



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4 May 1955



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
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State Dept. review completed

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. Soviet officials shun Israeli national day reception (page 3).

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GENERAL

1. Soviet officials shun Israeli national day reception:

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[REDACTED] Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow comments that he has never before seen a national day diplomatic reception shunned so thoroughly by Soviet officialdom as the one given by the new Israeli ambassador on 27 April, two days after he had presented his credentials. The only Soviet official to attend was a minor protocol officer.

According to Bohlen, the explanation was presumably contained in the next day's Pravda, which charged that the Israeli action in freeing the "terrorists" who had assaulted the Soviet and Czech legations in Tel Aviv in February 1953 was an affront to the Soviet and Czech people.

Bohlen adds that, by contrast, Soviet propaganda and the 16 April Soviet Foreign Ministry communiqué on the Near East have accorded the "independent" Arab states the warmest treatment.

Comment: For the past year the Soviet attitude toward Israel has been "correct" and formally friendly. Since March, when the possibility of extending the Turkish-Iraqi pact suddenly became a live issue in the Near East, the Soviet Foreign Ministry has displayed a more active effort to encourage Arab neutrality. This has led the Communist bloc to associate itself with the Arab position in the Palestine dispute at the Bandung conference, to which Israel was not invited, and at the earlier New Delhi peace conference.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Saigon "Revolutionary Committee" seen possibly seizing power:

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[REDACTED] The American embassy in Saigon reports having a "feeling of uneasiness" about the newly formed "People's Revolutionary

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[REDACTED] Committee" and believes that if Diem should accept the support of this group in a bid to depose Bao Dai, the chances are great he would shortly find himself its prisoner.

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Comment: The Revolutionary Committee appears to consist largely of sect leaders and political parvenus who are attempting to ensure their influence by a highly articulate exploitation of the popular anti-French and anti-Bao Dai feeling. Diem favors more moderate treatment of these issues, but may be hard put to quiet the clamor of the committee without jeopardizing his own popularity. American backing and the national army are Diem's principal tools in keeping the committee in line. A Viet Minh broadcast on 1 May described the committee as a "farce."

General The was reportedly killed on 3 May while conducting operations against the Binh Xuyen.

3. Indonesian opposition leader foresees difficulties for dual nationality treaty:

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[REDACTED] Masjumi chairman Natsir told the American ambassador on 30 April that tension over the dual nationality treaty with Communist China is growing not only in the Chinese community but also among informed Indonesians. He indicated that opposition to the treaty is already so strong he will have little difficulty in preventing its ratification.

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Comment: The dual nationality treaty with Communist China, signed on 22 April, provides that Overseas Chinese must reject either Chinese or Indonesian citizenship within two years of the treaty's ratification. It does not permit the Chinese to choose Chinese Nationalist citizenship.

Antigovernment Indonesians are concerned that a large number of local Chinese assuming Indonesian citizenship will support the leftist regime now in power. Many Chinese, on the other hand, are loath to make a choice because they realize their freedom is likely to be considerably curtailed no matter what decision they make.

In the face of possible defeat on this issue, the government may, as it has in other instances, indefinitely postpone parliamentary consideration of the matter.

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem

This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 3 May 1955.

1. No significant developments have been reported.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]